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Essay
Political Asylum and the Theory
of Judicial Review
Stephen H. Legomsky*
Few problems challenge the national conscience in quite
the same way as asylum.. Competing values clamor for recogni-
tion. Policymakers must consider conservation of finite na-
tional resources, preservation of domestic tranquility, and
maintenance of friendly relations with other governments. In
addition, however, they must respect international obligations
and foster harmony between our laws and our shared moral
commitment to fellow humans in distress.
The resolutions of these conflicts are most visible at the
legislative and executive levels of government. But the courts
must wrestle with many of these same concerns. They formu-
late policy in areas not fully occupied by other branches, and
they review the administrative application of policies already in
force.
Several congressional bills introduced in recent years at-
tempted to restrict judicial review of asylum decisions in vary-
ing ways and to varying degrees. These efforts, noted below,
have failed thus far. Sentiment for limiting judicial review of
asylum decisions remains strong, however, and future proposals
are inevitable. Like past legislative initiatives, these bills will
raise both narrow issues regarding the merits of the specific re-
strictions they would impose and broader questions that con-
cern judicial review as an institution.
Congressional attempts to restrict review of asylum deci-
sions represent only one strand of the recent pattern of assaults
on judicial review in controversial areas of the law. Given both
the trend toward narrowing the scope of judicial review and the
growing importance of asylum in the United States and other
developed countries, it is worth pausing to examine the theory
* Professor of Law, Washington University.
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of judicial review and to take stock of its virtues and its vices.
What, exactly, does judicial review of administrative action ac-
complish? What is its price? To what extent, if any, do asylum
cases possess special attributes that skew the balance?
After a brief summary of the provisions that currently gov-
ern asylum and of the recent legislative proposals for modifying
them, this Essay identifies features of asylum cases relevant to
the conceptual foundations of judicial review. The Essay then
examines the gains and the losses flowing from judicial review
of administrative action generally and from judicial review of
asylum decisions in particular.
I. CURRENT LAW AND PROPOSED CHANGES
The Immigration and Nationality Act1 supplies two distinct
routes to asylum. One provision of the Act, section 208, confers
on the Attorney General of the United States the discretion to
grant asylum to any "refugee" physically within American ter-
ritory or at a land border or port of entry.2 With some qualifi-
cations, the term refugee includes any alien unable or unwilling
to return home "because of persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion." The At-
torney General has delegated the discretionary power to grant
asylum under this section to district directors of the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service ("INS"). 4 Although a district
director's denial of asylum generally is neither administratively
appealable5 nor judicially reviewable, s the alien may renew an
asylum application in any subsequent exclusion or deportation
proceeding.7
Section 243(h) of the Act8 paves the second route to asy-
lum. With some exceptions, this section prohibits the Attorney
General from returning an alien to any country in which the
alien's life or freedom would be threatened for any of the rea-
l. Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1-1557 (1982 &
Supp. V 1987)).
2. Immigration and Nationality Act [hereinafter I. & N. Act], § 208, 8
U.S.C. § 1158 (1982).
3. Id. § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A).
4. 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(a) (1988).
5. Id. § 208.8(c).
6. Chen Chaun-Fa v. Kiley, 459 F. Supp. 762, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
7. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9 (1988).
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
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sons listed in section 208.9 Unlike section 208, which grants a
discretionary power, section 243(h) establishes a mandatory bar
when the stated conditions exist. Also unlike section 208, how-
ever, section 243(h) does not always, even when successfully in-
voked, enable the alien to remain in the United States. Section
243(h) prohibits return to the country of persecution, but it
does not prevent removal to a third country.
Administrative officials known as immigration judges adju-
dicate all requests for relief under section 243(h) during exclu-
sion or deportation hearings.1 0 If the immigration judge denies
such a request, the alien can appeal the resulting exclusion or
deportation order to the Justice Department's Board of Immi-
gration Appeals ("BIA"). 1 ' The alien can apply for habeas
corpus in federal district court to obtain judicial review of a fi-
nal exclusion order.12 Judicial review of a final deportation or-
der normally is by petition for review in a United States court
of appeals.1 3
Recent legislative proposals to modify judicial review of
asylum decisions have varied significantly in their reach. One
bill undertook to foreclose judicial review of all asylum deci-
sions.14 Others would have allowed judicial review only when
the asylum decision had been entered during the course of ex-
clusion or deportation proceedings,1 5 and would have narrowed
the scope of review even in those cases by prohibiting reversal
on the ground that substantial evidence did not support an ad-
ministrative finding of fact.16 Two of the bills sought, in addi-
tion, to eliminate all judicial review of administrative decisions
that refuse to reopen exclusion or deportation proceedings.17
II. ASYLUM CASES
Asylum cases possess a number of attributes pertinent to
judicial review. Perhaps the most obvious is the potential mag-
9. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (defining refugee).
10. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.3, 242.17(c) (1988).
11. Id. § 3.1(b)(I)-(2).
12. I. & N. Act § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1982).
13. Id § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § ilO5a(a).
14. S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 123(a), 129 CONG. REC. 5516, 5520 (1983).
15. See H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 123(a)(2), 123(b)(1983); H.R.
2361, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 122(a)(2), 122(b) (1983).
16. See H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 123(a)(9) (1983); H.R. 2361, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 122(a)(9) (1983).
17. See S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 123(b), 129 CONG. REC. 5516, 5520
(1983); H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 123(b) (1983).
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nitude of the individual interests at stake. By definition, erro-
neous denials of applications for asylum jeopardize the
applicants' freedom and sometimes their lives.
Moreover, like other classes of aliens, asylum applicants
are politically powerless. Unable to vote or to hold office,'8
aliens lack the tools available to other constituencies for influ-
encing legislative and executive policy. To be sure, aliens some-
times benefit from the lobbying activities of groups with whom
they share common interests. The agricultural provisions of
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 198619-the prod-
uct of intensive lobbying by growers 2°-are a prime example.
Such alliances can be productive in selected contexts, but are
an inadequate substitute for independent lobbying strength
that does not rest on the fortuities of shared interests. To a
greater degree than other groups, aliens therefore must depend
on the courts for the protection of important rights.
The issues presented in asylum cases tend to be legal and
factual, rather than discretionary. Legal questions abound con-
cerning the standard of proof, the content of due process, the
meaning of persecution, the breadth of the political opinion
prong, and the applicability of the asylum provisions to nongov-
ernmental persecutors.21 The cases also frequently turn on fac-
tual predictions as to the likelihood that specific individuals
will suffer persecution.
Evidence of persecution, vital to asylum cases, can be un-
usually inaccessible. The most knowledgeable witnesses and
the most probative documentary evidence might be overseas.
In the rush of leaving, refugees often lack the time to assemble
crucial documentation. For the same reason, the more orderly
screening process that the consulates abroad apply to other in-
tending immigrants can be impractical for refugees.22 Further,
18. See generally Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the
Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977) (noting historical and constitu-
tional arguments for allowing alien voting and current lack of alien voting
rights).
19. Pub. L. 99-603, §§ 201-04, 301-05, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394 (1986) (codified at
8 U.S.C. §§ 1255a, 1160-1161 (Supp. V 1987)).
20. See Boswell, The Immigration Reform Amendments of 1986: Reform
or Rehash?, 14 J. LEGIS. 23, 23 n.6 (1987); Yale-Loehr, Foreign Farm Workers
in the U.S.: The Impact of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 333, 335, 348-49 (1986-87).
21. See generally T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS
AND POLICY 638-726 (1985).
22. The ordinary visa process for immigrants is described in I. & N. Act
§§ 221, 222, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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even when useful documents are available, the sensitivity of
their contents might limit or even prevent disclosure.23 Be-
cause eye-witness accounts and documentary evidence so fre-
quently are unavailable, administrative officials often must rely
largely on gut-level credibility assessments.
The unusual relevance of foreign policy is another crucial
attribute of asylum cases. A finding that persecution is likely
reflects official skepticism about the willingness or ability of a
foreign government to guarantee a modicum of civilized behav-
ior. Governments understandably shy away from making such
statements about their allies in a public forum.24
Those are some of the characteristic features of asylum de-
cisions. How do they affect the desirability of judicial review?
III. THE BENEFITS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Advocates of judicial review often emphasize the indepen-
dence that review brings to the administrative process. Inde-
pendence is especially important in asylum cases because the
BIA is subordinate in every way to the Attorney General.
Apart from having created the BIA, the Attorney General de-
fines its jurisdiction, names its members, may remove individ-
ual members, may dissolve the BIA, and may reverse any of its
decisions.25
The advantages of independence are twofold. If adjudica-
tors are to decide cases on their merits, they must feel secure in
handing down decisions that reflect their actual legal conclu-
sions and findings of fact. Further, independence enables offi-
cials who decide cases to satisfy individual parties and the
general public that the proceedings were fair.
These considerations are particularly relevant in asylum
cases. Both actual justice and the appearance of justice assume
paramount importance when, as is true in asylum cases, the in-
dividual interests are great. Our legal system can tolerate occa-
sional unfairness when the stakes are trivial, but claims that
affect truly significant interests demand a more meticulous
brand of justice.
23. See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 686-700 (discussing
difficulty of admitting evidence in asylum cases).
24. See id. at 701-08.
25. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1988); Roberts, The Board of Immigration Appeals:
A Critical Reappraisal, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 29 (1977) (recounting observa-
tion of former chair of BIA that BIA has no statutory recognition and may be
abolished at will of Attorney General).
1989] 1209
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Independence is especially crucial when the aggrieved par-
ties lack access to normal political channels. For reasons given
earlier, asylum applicants generally lack such access. Their de-
pendence on an impartial judiciary is correspondingly great.
Finally, the appearance of justice takes on special meaning
in the context of asylum. The unsuccessful asylum applicant
who perceives procedural unfairness will bring that message
home. Our treatment of aliens can shape foreign impressions
of the American justice system.
In addition to fostering independence, judicial review adds
the influence of decisionmakers who possess generalist legal
knowledge. Unlike immigration judges, federal judges often re-
solve issues in other administrative settings and in constitu-
tional cases. They have experience in unraveling complex
statutes. They often can solve problems by finding analogies in
other areas of public law or even in private law. In short, fed-
eral judges generally have broader legal experience and a
broader knowledge of fundamental legal doctrine than do im-
migration judges.26
Legal generalism also boasts the benefit of relative free-
dom from bias. The immigration authorities who handle asy-
lum cases are bombarded, day after day, with compelling tales
of human tragedy. The natural response is to begin thinking in
relative terms. It would be unrealistic to expect a person to ad-
judicate a steady stream of asylum cases without at least uncon-
sciously devaluing the allegations of hardship. A court of
general jurisdiction, faced with few asylum cases, has less op-
portunity to develop either that kind of institutional callous-
ness or undue sympathy for the agency officials whose decisions
it reviews. Thus, a generalist court can approach asylum cases
with a broader and less tainted perspective.
The judicial attributes discussed up to this point, indepen-
dence and generalist legal knowledge, effectively improve the
quality of the decisions that actually are reviewed in court. But
judicial review also serves another function, one that operates
even in cases that never reach court. The mere possibility that
an alien will seek judicial review of an asylum decision encour-
ages the various administrative authorities to study the case
carefully and to state their reasoning intelligibly. The process
26. For a more expansive discussion of the advantages and disadvantages
of specialist courts, see Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency
Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297,
1388-92 (1986).
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of drafting reasoned dispositions can help administrative deci-
sionmakers expose and resolve analytical problems on their
own.
In asylum cases, the importance of the individual interests
at stake strengthens the argument for requiring careful reflec-
tion. The prevalence of legal issues magnifies the need to con-
sider the logical future implications of the decision. Further,
the knowledge that a reviewing court might search the record
for "substantial evidence" can encourage the administrative tri-
bunal to consider more carefully the connection between the
evidence and the tribunal's tentative findings of fact.
As a final benefit, judicial review in federal court provides
a structure for the gradual development of legal doctrine.
Without judicial review, a single administrative agency, the
BIA, would pronounce all caselaw in the area of asylum. The
independence and generalist knowledge that aid the courts in
assuring justice for the litigants also aid them in articulating
law for the future. Moreover, the stringent standards for se-
lecting federal judges increase the probability of thoughtful and
rigorous legal analysis as well as clear and precise opinions. Fi-
nally, the multiplicity of courts makes possible a continuinAg
conversation among judges of differing viewpoints. This judi-
cial dialogue fosters a heightened understanding; opinions can
build on one another in a way that is not possible when a single
centralized tribunal announces law unilaterally.
IV. THE COSTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review has its costs. Some of them are the mirror
images of some of the benefits described earlier. Thus,
although proponents of judicial review stress judicial indepen-
dence, opponents emphasize the judiciary's relative lack of pub-
lic accountability. The more prominent the policy issues a
given class of cases presents, opponents argue, the more reason
to lodge the adjudicative function in a body subject to a political
check.
Asylum cases can indeed raise important questions of na-
tional policy. As mentioned earlier, decisions can influence, or
can be influenced by, foreign relations concerns best entrusted
to the political branches of government.
These considerations are weak arguments for eliminating
judicial review. First, as observed earlier, asylum cases turn
frequently on factual determinations. At issue, usually, is
whether the alien is likely to face persecution if sent home.
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The lack of judicial accountability is no reason to eliminate the
courts' traditional role of searching for substantial evidence to
support the administrative finding. Nor is lack of accountabil-
ity a reason to exclude judicial participation in the process of
interpreting the Constitution, the statute, or the regulations.
Even when the sole question is whether an administrative
tribunal should exercise its discretion favorably, judicial review
is perfectly appropriate. The discretionary determinations
might well entail the formulation of policy, but not all policy
decisions are or should be unreviewable. A court properly may
review for abuse of discretion unless the statute precludes judi-
cial review or the "agency action is committed to agency discre-
tion by law."27
That last observation has particular relevance to legislative
proposals aimed at eliminating judicial review of BIA decisions
that refuse to reopen deportation proceedings. At present,
courts review those refusals for abuse of discretion.28 In dis-
charging that function, courts serve a useful oversight role. In
various immigration contexts, courts have invalidated adminis-
trative decisions because the officials failed to exercise discre-
tion,29 because they based discretionary decisions on improper
factors,30 because they ignored relevant considerations,31 be-
cause they failed to explain decisions,32 and because they de-
parted inexplicably from previous departmental policies.33 In
all of those instances, judicial review for abuse of discretion
sends a socially desirable signal to the officials on whom the
Attorney General has conferred discretionary powers.34
A second cost of judicial review mirrors the benefits of
generalist knowledge. The BIA, like other administrative
tribunals, has specialized expertise that is valuable in the reso-
lution of technically complex asylum cases. Thus, an argument
27. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982).
28. See, e.g., INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 445 (1985); INS v. Jong Ha
Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144-45 (1981).
29. Asimakopoulos v. INS, 445 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9th Cir. 1971).
30. Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966) (stating that
agency abuses discretion when it bases decision on race).
31. Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1981) (criti-
cizing BIA for failure to consider deprivation of means of earning a living).
32. Sida v. I.N.S., 665 F.2d 851, 854-55 (9th Cir. 1981).
33. Factora v. District Director, 292 F. Supp. 518, 522 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
34. For a thoughtful discussion of judicial control of INS discretion, see
Developments in the Law, Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1395-1400 (1983).
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against judicial review is that it subjects an expert decision to
non-expert review.
Precisely what relevant expertise does the BIA have?
First, from its experience in past cases, the BIA has acquired a
familiarity with the specific statutory provisions, regulations,
and caselaw that govern asylum. Second, through its handling
of immigration cases other than those in which an alien claims
asylum, 35 the BIA has developed a broad understanding of the
immigration process. The BIA members and staff do not be-
come legal generalists, but neither are they asylum specialists.
For present purposes, it is useful to view BIA personnel as im-
migration generalists. Seen in that light, their knowledge of
subject matter broader than asylum enables them to perform a
function analogous to that of generalist courts. The BIA can
rely on its knowledge to assure that its asylum decisions com-
port with more general immigration principles and create a co-
herent body of law.
Despite its impressive knowledge of immigration law, there
is one relevant area of specialized knowledge to which the BIA
has no greater claim than the courts: foreign affairs. Except
possibly when factual disputes concern the conditions in a
country from which an asylum claimant in a recent previous
case was fleeing, the BIA will have no advantage over a court
in assessing the legitimacy of the alien's fear.
More importantly, even in cases in which past experience
gives the BIA an edge over a court, the limited nature of the
judicial role diminishes the significance of that disparity. The
function of the court is to review the stated reasons for the
BIA's decision. In searching for rationality or for substantial
evidence, the court is aided less by specialized expertise than by
judgment.36 Further, to the extent that specialized expertise
helps the reviewing court discharge even those limited respon-
sibilities, the BIA's reasoned opinion can convey any considera-
tions that the BIA, with its expertise, found relevant.
A third cost of judicial review is the loss of uniformity.
Without judicial review, the decisions of the BIA would apply
nationwide. Splits of authority among courts mean different
law for different geographic regions of the United States. Na-
tionally uniform rules assume particular importance when, as
in asylum cases, outcomes can affect international relations. In
35. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1986) (defining jurisdiction of BIA).
36. This point is well made, in another context, by Nathanson, The Ad-
ministrative Court Proposal, 57 VA. L. REV. 996, 999-1000 (1971).
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foreign policy matters, opponents of judicial review would ar-
gue, the nation should speak with a single voice.
Centralization has other benefits as well. It ensures equal
treatment of similarly situated asylum applicants. Asylum
should not hinge on an accident of geography. Nor should the
law reward forum shopping. In addition, it might appear ineffi-
cient for several different courts to till the same soil when a
single tribunal could perform the task alone.
Those concerns are valid, but they do not outweigh the
benefits of judicial review. Conflicts among the federal circuits
are not unique to asylum cases or even to immigration law gen-
erally. They are an accepted feature of our federal judicial sys-
tem. Although the foreign affairs implications of asylum
decisions might appear to aggravate the usual problems associ-
ated with judicial conflicts, the cases most likely to affect for-
eign relations rest on factual findings that the named aliens
will face persecution if forced to return home. Those findings
relate only to the evidence in particular cases, do not have the
effect of precedent, and thus create no judicial conflicts.
Moreover, generally accepted notions of proper judicial
deference limit the likelihood of unequal treatment. When the
BIA decides an asylum case, it makes all the factual findings;
the reviewing court, in keeping with general principles of ad-
ministrative law, merely searches the record for substantial evi-
dence.3 7 Even on questions of law, the usual judicial deference
to an agency's statutory interpretations can be a unifying force.
Further, if an exceptional case does raise a sensitive question
affecting international relations, a reviewing court can invoke
the political question doctrine.38
Finally, as discussed earlier, conflicts among circuits are
not wholly negative; they yield benefits as well. A multiplicity
of judicial views contributes to the thoughtful evolution of the
law. If the occasional split between circuits raises a sufficiently
important issue for which consistency is desirable, the Supreme
Court can restore the needed uniformity. In discharging that
function, the Court may evaluate the diverging viewpoints of
the lower courts. Access to differing views is unusually valua-
ble in an area as politically charged as asylum. Such debate is
37. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982) (permitting the reviewing court to set
aside action lacking substantial evidence to support it); see also I. & N. Act
§ 106(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1982) (stating that deportation decisions re-
quire "reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence").
38. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
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essential in cases whose outcomes often depend on deeply-held
personal notions of social obligation, foreign policy, national
community, and our nation's place within, and obligations to,
the world community.
Critics of judicial review of asylum decisions also contend
that such review adds one more step to the already lengthy pro-
cess. The resulting delay impedes one of the very purposes of
administrative tribunals-speedy adjudication. In addition, be-
cause asylum claimants ordinarily arrive without entry docu-
ments, and because the INS normally detains excluded aliens
who lack entry documents pending the admission decisions,39
the state must maintain excluded asylum claimants at public
expense while judicial review is pending. Moreover, to the ex-
tent that aliens have an incentive to postpone deportation, this
delay feeds on itself; the longer the potential delay, the greater
is the incentive to seek judicial review. The greater the incen-
tive, the greater the number of aliens likely to act on that in-
centive, and thus the longer the delay.
These concerns should not be dismissed casually, but their
practical significance is much less than one might first assume.
The advantage of delay is not unique to asylum cases, or even
to immigration cases generally. Delay can benefit the appellant
in many administrative contexts. In theory, incentives to pro-
long litigation can arise whenever the government wishes to
terminate existing benefits. In any event, the volume of asy-
lum cases reviewed in federal courts is low, partly because the
INS detention policy dampens any incentive to delay through
appeal. In fiscal year 1984 aliens sought judicial review in only
100 deportation cases and seventeen exclusion cases that
presented asylum claims, including challenges to administrative
decisions refusing to reopen deportation or exclusion proceed-
ings in which asylum was claimed.40
The delay argument has slightly greater force when the
challenged decision was a refusal to reopen or reconsider a pre-
vious deportation order. As noted earlier, two of the congres-
sional proposals to restrict judicial review contained provisions
that specifically targeted motions to reopen. The concern has
39. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (1986).
40. See Legomsky, supra note 26, at 1402. Of the 100 deportation cases, 85
were petitions for review filed directly in the courts of appeals pursuant to I.
& N. Act § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), which permits judicial review of depor-
tation orders. The remaining 15 were habeas corpus applications filed in the
district courts pursuant to I. & N. Act § 106(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(9).
Legomsky, supra note 26, at 1402.
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been that motions to reopen permit an endless string of proce-
dural maneuvers calculated only to stall removal. Although
cases of abuse occasionally occur, even the total number of asy-
lum cases, both genuine and frivolous, is far too small to justify
current alarm.
The final objections to judicial review of asylum decisions
are fiscal and administrative. Eliminating judicial review of
any class of cases saves money and eases the workload of an
overburdened judiciary. Appointing more judges might solve
the workload problem, but it would increase public expense
and create other problems. Increasing the sizes of existing
courts might strain collegial decisionmaking; creating new fed-
eral circuits would increase the potential for intercircuit
conflicts.41
Again, however, so few asylum cases actually reach federal
court that the administrative benefits of eliminating them
would scarcely be felt. Further, as the foregoing discussion il-
lustrates, there is no principled reason to single out asylum
cases for special restrictions on judicial review.
CONCLUSION
This is a time of sustained and vocal resistance to judicial
participation in a wide range of modern controversies. It is pre-
cisely in times like these that acknowledging the vital role of
judicial review in our constitutional democracy is imperative.
Judicial review brings both actual and perceived independence
from the executive branch of government. It adds a generalist,
and a less calloused, perspective. And its availability gives ad-inistrative authorities an incentive to approach these impor-
tant decisions fairly and carefully.
Judicial review is peculiarly important to asylum appli-
cants. An erroneous asylum denial can threaten life, and the
affected individuals cannot count on the political process for
protection. For them, the benefits of judicial review are com-
pelling. As this Essay has shown, the countervailing costs are
not onerous.
41. See Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-16 (1975) (com-
paring advantages of district court and court of appeals review of administra-
tive action).
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